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tion does not preclude severance or deletion when, in the discretion
of the trial judge, actual prejudice will ensue. 39
Since the general rule may be damaging because it directs atten-
tion to the nonconfessing defendant, it may be that the defendant
should be given the opportunity to decide if the limiting instruction
should be given and how emphatic the admonition should be.
If credibility can be ascribed to the contention that the jury
follows the court's limiting instruction, then the only safeguard against
prejudice4° is an unmistakably dear admonition to the jury.
41
The decision as to which method to invoke must rest on the nature
and facts of each case.42 No single solution is applicable to every sit-
uation, and therefore, it seems as if there is no adequate substitute
for the sound discretion of the trial judge in protecting such im-
portant interests.
ROBERT E. PAYNE
THE MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE CLAUSE
IN THEFT INSURANCE
Fraudulent claims constitute a substantial moral hazard for com-
panies writing theft insurance,1 and insurers ordinarily require the in-
E.g., Wellman v. United States, 227 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1955); People v. Skelly,
409 II. 613, too N.E.2d 915, 920 (1951).
"'"Perhaps even at best the safeguards provided by clear rulings on admissibil-
ity, limitations on the bearing of evidence as against particular individuals, and
adequate instructions, are insufficient to ward off the danger entirely. It is therefore
extremely important that those safeguards be made impregnable as possible." Blum-
enthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-60 (x947)-
Failure to give limiting instructions has been held to be error. Everitt v. United
States, 281 F.2d 429 (5 th Cir. 196o); Johnson v. State, 46 Ga. App. 494, 167 S.E. 900
(Ct. App. 1933); State v. Allison, 175 Minn. 218, 220 N.W. 563 (1928).
4'United States v. Sykes, 305 F.2d 172, 176 (6th Cir. 1962).
-'Whether cautionary instructions to the jury to disregard prejudical evidence
erroneously admitted will cure the error depends, of course, upon the nature of it
and the circumstances in each instance. When it cannot with reasonable certainty be
shown that the harm has been undone a reversal is required." United States v.
Sansone, 2o6 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1953).
12 Richards, Insurance § 298 (5th ed. 1952). Vance, Insurance § 199 (3d ed. 1951).
"Moral hazard" in theft insurance means the danger of fraudulent claim of loss,
as measured by the character and interest of the insured, his habits, reputation for
integrity, and the amount of gain he would make or the loss he would suffer by
the disappearance of the property. Compare Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
Because of the difficulty and expense of investigating many small claims, the
insurance companies realize that they must depend upon the integrity of the people
insured. If the majority of people were not honest, theft coverage could not be
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sured to supply "proof" that his loss did occur by theft.2 There are,
however, many instances in which the insured can show only that
an item has disappeared, and that it was stolen is merely a conjectural
explanation, perhaps supported by circumstantial evidence. It has
been said that indemnification claims under the theft clause for un-
explained disappearances were often determined by the mere whim
of the insurer.3 As a result of dissatisfaction with the clause limiting
coverage to "theft," the "mysterious disappearance" clause was added
in order to define the coverage more specifically.
The recent case of Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co.4 examines
the permutations of the mysterious disappearance clause, and provides
a good illustration of the extent to which that clause has developed
in insurance law. In 1961, defendant issued to the plaintiff a three-
year homeowner's policy which included protection against various
perils, including the peril of theft, "meaning any act of stealing or
attempt thereat," of personal property on the premises, or while
"owned, worn or used" off the premises. In 1962, for an additional pre-
mium, coverage was extended by an endorsement to "mysterious dis-
appearance (except mysterious disappearance of a precious or semi-
precious stone from its setting in any watch or piece of jewelry)." 5
While dining out with friends, plaintiff discovered that her val-
uable necklace was missing. The clasp had never given any difficulty,
and when she had put it on earlier in the evening, a slight tug had
issued at all. Opgenorth, Mysterious Disappearance and Presumption of Theft
Clause, 1952 Ins. L.J. 97, 129. Quinn, New Residence and Theft Policy-Mysterious
Disappearance... and Other Points, The Weekly Underwriter, May 6, 194 , p.
1064, 1067.
2See any Standard Homeowners Policy "jacket."
Quinn, supra note i, at 1064. The insurance companies did not have a policy of
rejecting all claims that could not be absolutely proved, but complaints were made
that decisions as to whether claims should be paid or rejected too often depended
upon the personal prejudices, idiosyncrasies, or moods of individual adjusting
agents or claims managers. During the twenty-odd years which the theft policies
were silent as to what would or would not be deemed sufficient evidence of loss by
theft, a large number of suits were brought for indemnification for mysteriously
disappearing personalty.
4385 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
'This wording is one of the forms taken by the 1956 revision of the mysterious
disappearance provision. Infra note 25. The reason that the endorsement required an
additional fee is partially explained by its second paragraph, which extends coverage
to unattended automobiles. See, Extended Theft Endorsement HO-1o5 (Ed. 9-58).
It is reasonable to believe, however, that some part of the extra charge was intended
to compensate for extra coverage for mysterious disappearance. The answer of the
insurance company is that the addition of the endorsement eases the burden of proof
on the insured by allowing him to prove merely unexplained loss, rather than
theft. See, e.g., The Fire, Casualty and Surety Bulletins, Questions and Answers,
October 1963, p. 68.
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shown that it was properly latched. A search of the places where she
had been that night-clubs, parking lots, car, garage, and home-did
not turn up the necklace. The plaintiff had not come into physical con-
tact with anyone through shoving, jostling, or dancing. In the claim
she filed with the insurance company, the plaintiff said that she be-
lieved the necklace "just fell off and someone picked it up," and at the
trial she offered the same opinion. "[I]t was either lost or stolen."
'6
The defendant denied the claim on the ground that loss did not
qualify as "mysterious disappearance." 7 Plaintiff thereupon brought
suit and recovered judgment for $3oo, the agreed value of the neck-
lace. The judgment was affirmed by a Missouri Court of Appeals.8
The court followed the majority rule that mysterious disappearance
as stated in the clause under consideration was a separately covered
risk, 9 and held that although the earlier policy forms would have re-
G"Lost" property may be the subject of a theft if the finder makes no effort to re-
turn it even though he has a reasonable opportunity to ascertain the identity of
the owner. See, Perkins, Criminal Law ao8 (1957); 2 Wharton, Criminal Law and
Procedure § 459 (1ath ed. 1957).
-The defendant's definition of a mysterious disappearance was "the separation
of an item of personal property from its owner's possession by the owner's inten-
tional placing of it in an identified [fixed) location, followed by its disappearance
under unexplained circumstances.... On the other hand, there is nothing myster-
ious about losing or mislaying property; it is a common, everyday occurrence."
Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 4, at 665-66.
In an aside, the court doubted that the frequency of disappearances should be
given any consideration, "for if the fact that 'it is a common, everyday occurrence'
to lose or mislay personalty bars such disappearance from being regarded as 'mys-
terious,' disappearances by reason of theft, unfortunately also 'a common, everyday
occurrence,' no more logically or reasonably could be regarded as mysterious.'"
Id. at 666 n.5.
It must also be remembered that a frequent occurrence to the insurer is not
necessarily such to an individual insured.
"Plaintiff also appealed from the trial court's refusal to award damages and
attorney's fee for defendant's alleged vexatious refusal to indemnify her loss.
Since, however, this was a case of first impression, and an insurer has a right
to entertain an honest erroneous opinion as to its liability where there is an open
question of law or an issue of fact determinative of liability, this part of the
judgment, too, was affirmed. Id. at 667-69.
"The rule was first enunciated in Englehart v. Assurance Co. of America, 139 So.
ad io8 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (discussed infra in text at note 26). Accord: Seward v.
Assurance Co. of America, 218 Cal. App. 2d 895, 32 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Super Ct. 1963)
(insured missed her watch during the course of a shopping trip; watch had a
double lock which was in good mechanical condition and had never needed repair).
Michigan Millers Ins. Co. v. Geller, 168 So. 2d 2o4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (insured's
ring disappeared from her finger while she visited two stores in a shopping center;
held, "the language of the policy makes loss from mysterious disappearance
equivalent to theft"). Midlo v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 16o So. 2d 314
(La. Ct. App. 1964) (discussed infra in text at note 38). Conlin v. Dakota Fire Ins.
Co., 126 N.W..d 421 (N.D. 1964) (discussed infra in text at note 31). Contra: Austin
v. American Cas. Co., 193 A.ad 741 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963) (discussed infra note 29).
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quired an inference of theft, the instant policy permitted a reasonable
finding of "mysterious disappearance" without such an inference.10
Early policies covering theft required the claimant to show "by
direct and affirmative evidence" exactly how his loss had been sus-
tained, and mere proof of disappearance, even under circumstances in-
explicable by means other than larceny or theft, was not a sufficient
basis for recovery. 1 Since most theft is secretive, many claims which in
good conscience should have been paid were denied payment because
it was impossible for the insured to produce the requisite proof.12
The inequity of requiring an insured to prove his loss by direct
evidence was not judicially recognized for many years, but in 1915
it was decided that circumstantial evidence should be sufficient to
prove theft, even under a "direct and affirmative evidence" policy, if
there was more than the bare circumstance of unexplained disappear-
ance.'3 Even though the burden of proof remained on the insured, and
iHammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 4, at 666-67.
"Schindler v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 58 Misc. 532, 109 N.Y. Supp. 723
(App. T. 19o8) (the first case involving a loss under a personal theft policy; insured
placed a handbag containing jewelry in a closet and went out; when she returned
it had disappeared. A servant had been alone in the house). Duschenes v. National
Sur. Co., 79 Misc. 232, 139 N.Y. Supp. 881 (App. T. 1913) (items disappeared
from hotel room to which only plaintiff had legal access). Gordon v. Aetna Indem.
Co., 116 N.Y. Supp. 558 (App. T. 19o9) (locket placed under pillow; insured had
not left the house all day; search of servants' belongings turned up nothing).
The earliest theft policies, issued during the i8go's, contained a provision that
"the mere disappearance of an article is not to be deemed sufficient evidence of its
loss by burglary, theft, or larceny." The apparent reason for this clause was timidity
on the part of insurers, who were venturing a new coverage and did not know
what to expect. The clause was replaced after a short period by the "direct and
affirmative evidence" clause. Several cases in which circumstantial evidence was held
enough to overcome a "mere disappearance" provision are: Reed v. American
Bonding Co., o02 Neb. 113, 166 N.W. 196 (1918); Great E. Gas. Co. v. Boll, 187
S.W. 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
"Opgenorth, supra note 1, at 97.
3Fienglas v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 151 N.Y. Supp. 371 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C.
1915) (first case to allow circumstantial evidence; assured left prospective tenant in
hall momentarily; jewelry which had been left on dresser near door opening onto
hall disappeared).
"[A thief] never invites anyone, unless it be a confederate, to witness the opera-
tion. To limit the assured's right to recovery to cases where the corpus delicti can
be proved by direct testimony ... would make the policy next to valueless. We will
not impute to the defendant company any such purpose in the use of these words;
nor can we assume that the assured understood them in this narrow and restricted
sense...." Miller v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 247 Pa. 182, 93 At. 320, 321
(1915).
Accord: National Sur. Co. v. Fox, 174 Ark. 827, 296 S. W. 718 (1927); Firemen's
Fund Indem. Co. v. Perry, 149 Fla. 410, 5 So. 2d 862 (1942); Sowden v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 122 Kan. 375, 252 Pac. 208 (1927); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Wathen,
205 Ky. 511, 266 S.W. 4 (1924); Wolf v. Aetna Acc. & Liability Co., 183 App. Div.
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though a mere showing that theft was one of several possible explana-
tions did not sustain this burden,'4 the courts occasionally showed
great willingness to sustain awards granted on the basis of question-
able circumstances.' 5
Notwithstanding the allowance of circumstantial evidence to show
larceny, there remained a widespread dissatisfaction with the coverage
given under the old policies. In 1943, the theft clause was amended
to eliminate the necessity for strained interpretations. 16 Among other
409, 17o N.Y. Supp. 787 (1918); Stitch v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 N.Y. Supp. 712
(App. T. 1916); Hamill v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 104 Pa. Super. 6o2, 159 At. 205 (1932);
McDuff v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 47 R.I. 172, 131 Atl. 548 (1925)-
"National Sur. Co. v. Redmon, 173 Ky. 294, 190 S.V. io8i (1917) (diamond stud
left in tray on dresser near second floor window; marks on screen and footprints
on shed roof below window, discovered three weeks after loss, held not sufficient
evidence of burglary); Rosen v. Royal Indem. Co., 259 Mass. 194, 156 N.E. 52 (1927)
(diamond ring in handbag left in kitchen cabinet was discovered missing in after-
noon; a number of workmen, as well as the maid and chauffer, had been in and
out during the morning); Polstein v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 173
App. Div. 938, 158 N.Y. Supp. 868 (1916) (jewelery missing; no other facts reported);
Bachmand v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 194 N.Y. Supp. 89 (App. T. 1922) (insured
had reported missing jewelry to police as "lost"; there was no evidence pointing
persuasively to the conclusion that theft was the explanation, and strong circum-
stantial evidence to the contrary); Marks v. ,New Jersey Fid. & Plate Glass Ins. Co.,
68 N.Y. Supp. 627 (App. T. 1918) (insured had last seen certain articles prior to
packing to move to a new residence, but could not later find them; evidence was
held consistent with loss, but not with theft).
The Rosen case would probably have turned out differently under any of the
policies containing the various mysterious disappearance clauses. The Polstein case
was apparently decided on the ground that the circumstances shown did not elimi-
nate the possibility of misplacement or forgotten disposal; since the insured does
not ordinarily have the burden of eliminating such possibilities, the case is out-of-
line with the general view.
' E.g., "Upon this appeal the only serious question is whether this testimony
justifies the inference that the jewelry was stolen. It establishes that the jewelry was
placed in a box which only two persons were authorized to open. Neither of these
persons took out the jewelry. It follows with reasonable probability that some un-
authorized person opened the box and extracted the only articles of value. No
unauthorized person would have taken the jewelry, except with felonious intent.
"It follows that the judgment rests, not on mere suspicion, but on logical in-
ference, and should be affirmed...." Stich v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 N.Y. Supp.
712, 714 (App. T. 1916) (rings missing from hotel room).
"About the only proof that could be made as to burglary or larceny, ordinarily,
would be that the doors or windows were open and that articles that were in the
house before were missing and could not be found. This was sufficient proof that
they had been stolen...." National Sur. Co. v. Fox, 174 Ark. 827, 296 S.W. 718, 721
(1927) (insured rented his house while he went on an extended trip; he returned to
find doors and windows open, tenants gone, and articles of personalty missing).
"'Mutual Cas. Ins. Rating Bureau, Circular No. BTRR-i 4 5 , December 13, 1946.
The intent was not to broaden the coverage to include property merely mislaid
or lost, but was to make clearer the degree of proof needed to establish loss by
theft. Many persons, however, including insurance company officers and agents,
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revisions, the following sentence was added to the theft clause: "Mys-
terious disappearance of any insured property shall be presumed
to be due to theft."
17
This original mysterious disappearance clause was intended merely
to clarify theft policies and make them conform to the law as it had
developed.' 8 The first case involving the clause recognized this and
interpreted it as creating a rule of evidence binding on the parties
that the presumption of theft was equal to theft.19 Under this "pre-
sumptive theft" provision, proof of mysterious disappearance, without
more, was proof of theft.20 The presumption could be rebutted, how-
ever, upon an affirmative showing by the insurer that the surrounding
facts and circumstances indicated loss or mislaying of the property
to be more probable than theft.2 ' Mere speculation or surmise, there-
fore, do not rebut the presumption as a matter of law; 22 but where
the possibility of theft was remote, the presumption was easily re-
thought that there had been a basic change in coverage to an "all-risk" policy, and
the policy was often sold on that basis. Opgenorth, supra note i, at 97. Kelly, "Mys-
terious Disappearance" Defined, 28 Ins. Counsel J. 72, 73 (1961). Field, "Mysterious
Disappearance" Under the New Theft Policy, 1945 Ins. L.J. 3-
17Residence and Outside Theft Policy, AS 1719 NMA NS (3-46). The clause was
revised in 1948 to read: "Mysterious disappearance of any insured property, except
a precious or semiprecious stone from its setting in any watch or piece of jewelry,
shall be presumed to be due to theft." Residence and Outside Theft Policy, GPO
1719 Ed. 2 N NS (10-48). The reason for this exclusion was apparently the belief
that the companies were paying too many losses due to carelessness on the part of
the policy-holders.
'1Kelly, supra note 16, at 73. Quinn, supra note i, at io66.
1"Davis v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 227 N.C. 80, 40 S.E.2d 6o9 (1946)-
OCaldwell v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 210 Miss. 320, 49 So. 2d 570 (1950)
(insured's wife lost setting from her ring; maid who helped search left without
giving notice or collecting wages due). Levine Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 Misc.
135, 112 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1952) (insured removed his ring while
washing in a public rest-room, turned to dry his hands, walked out and forgot the
ring). Gordon v. Eureka Cas. Co., 187 Pa. Super. 636, 146 A.2d 379 (1958) (maid who
helped search for lost ring never returned after her day off).
masey v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America, 3 Misc. 2d 918, 16o
N.Y.S.2d 114 (Albany County Ct. 1956) (ring disappeared from pocket during busi-
ness day). Davis v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., supra note ig (insured went
fishing with $97 in his pocket, discovered it missing when he crawled from lake
after his boat capsized). Sigel v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 173 Pa. Super.
434, 98 A.2d 376 (1953) (insured placed ring wrapped in tissue into an envelope
with a similarly wrapped watch; envelope was not sealed; ring disappeared, but
watch did not; verdict to insurer, but new trial granted for error in instructions).
Erskine v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 76 Pa. D. & C. 172 (Dist. Ct. 1951) (insured was
feeding a horse when the animal snatched the diamond from her ring and dropped
it; the gem could not afterwards be found).
-Davis v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., supra note ig, at 611.
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butted;23 and where no fact evidenced even the remotest possibility
of theft, the presumption could not arise.24
The "presumptive theft" provision was rewritten in 1956 to elimi-
nate the presumption and make mysterious disappearance simply a
separate form of theft.25 The drafter's apparent intention was to
eliminate the evidentiary problems that had been encountered, but
to retain for the insured the benefit of more easily proving a loss. With
this in mind, insurance company counsel have tended to defend claims
under the revised clause on the ground that mysterious disappearance
is not shown unless a possibility of theft is also shown.
The courts have not gone along with this insurance company view.
When the 1956 revision was initially considered, in Englehart v. As-
surance Co. of America,26 wherein the insured appealed from a judg-
ment in favor of the insurer on a claim for a missing ring, the appellate
court originally upheld the judgment on the ground that the facts
did not present a reasonable possibility of theft. On rehearing, how-
ever, the court reversed and held mysterious disappearance to be a
separately covered risk. Two factors influenced the decision. Primarily,
23Ruby v. Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 158, 79 N.W.2d 644 (1956) (while
working with creosote, insured got it on his hands and ring; he pulled the ring
off in a barn to wash his hands; when he returned, the center diamond was missing).
2'Deckler v. Travelers Indem. Co., 94 So. 2d 55 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (insured's
wife discovered her ring missing after trying to fix garbage disposal). Loop v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 63 So. 2d 247 (La. Ct. App. 1953) (insured's wife put on
ring and went shopping; ring was gone when she returned home).
-Kelly, supra note 6, at 72.-3. Each insurance company is free to vary the
clause suggested by the Central Forms Committee; as it has come before the courts,
the 1956 revision has taken the following variations:
"This company agrees to pay for loss by theft or attempt thereat or myster-
ious disappearance away from the premises of personal property which is owned
or used by an insured...." Seward v. Assurance Co. of America, 218 Cal. App. 2d
895, 32 Cal. Rptr. 821, 822 (Super. Ct. 1963); Englehart v. Assurance Co. of America,
139 So. 2d io8, 11o (La. Ct. App. 1962).
"Theft, meaning any act of stealing or attempt thereat, or mysterious disap-
pearance (except mysterious disappearance of a precious or semi-precious stone from
its setting in any watch or piece of jewelry)." Austin v. American Cas. Co., 193 A.2d
741 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963); Michigan Millers Ins. Co. v. Geller, 168 So. 2d 204, 2o5
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d 661,
663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Conlin v. Dakota Fire Ins. Co., 16 N.WV.2d 421, 424
(N.D. 1964).
"Theft, including attempted theft, mysterious disappearance, larceny, burglary,
robbery .... Midlo v. Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co., 16o So. 2d 314, 315 (La.
Ct. App. 1964).
-31 3 9 So. 2d io8 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (the insured last noticed his ring when he
removed it before retiring; he did not notice the ring missing until later; in the
interim he had flown from Baton Rouge to Shreveport, rode in an airport limousine,
and sent the suit he had been wearing to the cleaners).
298 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
the court noted that the provision covered any loss incurred as a re-
sult of attempted theft, which clearly is a separate risk. Also, the
court noted that the exclusions listed for that coverage group included
a statement that the policy did not apply to mysterious loss of precious
or semiprecious stone from its setting, and "if the mysterious disappear-
ance is intended to be merely another form of theft, then no such ex-
clusion relating to a loss would be necessary."
27
All courts, 28 except one,29 which have considered the different
forms of the 1956 revision have declared that mysterious disappearance
is a separate risk and, as stated by the California Superior Court, that
"there is no necessity to show possibility or probability that the loss
resulted from theft."30
Another typical case in which the 1956 revision was considered is
Conlin v. Dakota Fire Ins. Co.,31 in which it was held that disappear-
ance of luggage, checked with an airline by an insured traveler, was
within the coverage of a mysterious disappearance clause. Although
relying on Englehart, the court placed great emphasis on the fact that
the clause was susceptible to various interpretations and should be
construed in the light most favorable to the insured.
32
In addition to agreeing with the reasoning of the Englehart and
Conlin cases, the court in Hammontree analyzed the 1956 revision
grammatically33 and decided that it must make mysterious disappear-
ance a separate risk. The court then adopted the definition of mys-
terious disappearance favored by a majority of the courts which have
reviewed the question.
34
"[A]ny disappearance or loss under unknown, puzzling or baf-
fling circumstances which arouse wonder, curiosity, or specula-
MId. at 112-113.
"See cases cited supra notes 4 and 9.
"The only case to hold that the language of the 1956 revision did not convert
mysterious disappearance into a separate risk is Austin v. American Cas. Co., 193
A.2d 741 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963). The authority of the case seems weak for two reasons:
(1) the court ignored the clause excluding recovery for gems lost from their mount-
ing, and (2) it apparently considered an "all-risk" interpretation to be the only
alternative to interpreting mysterious disappearance as evidence of theft. A case
in another jurisdiction was decided almost simultaneously on quite similar facts
and reached the opposite result. Seward v. Assurance Co. of America, 218 Cal. App.
2d 895, 32 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Super. Ct. 1963).
"OSeward v. Assurance Co. of America, supra note 29, at 823.
31126 N.W.2d 421 (N.D. 1964).
32Id. at 425. The familiar principle that a contract will be most strictly con-
strued against its drafter has always applied in insurance law. See, e.g., i Richards,
Insurance § 35, at 116 (5 th ed. 1952); 13 Appleman, Insurance § 7401 (1943).
"Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
3Id. at 666.
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tion, or circumstances which are difficult to understand or ex-
plain. A mysterious disappearance is a disappearance under cir-
stances which excite, and at the same time baffle, wonder or
curiosity."3
5
This definition is substantially different from that contended for by
the insurance company,36 but the court emphatically pointed out that
it was not under any obligation to accept "the construction accorded to
the policy terms by astute insurance specialists or perspicacious coun-
sel"; rather, it was "concerned with the meaning which the ordinary
insured of average intelligence and common understanding reasonably
would give to the words or language under consideration."
37
The notion in Hammontree, that there need not be any circum-
stances suggesting theft as a logical explanation, was also applied in
Midlo v. Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co.,38 wherein the Louis-
iana Court of Appeals held: "We take the mysterious disappearance
clause contained in the present policy to eliminate the necessity of
speculating upon and weighing the probabilities of various conceiv-
able explanations of such a disappearance."
3 9
The recent cases seem to indicate that the insurance companies
have created, perhaps unintentionally, a new insurance coverage which
is substantially different from that for theft, but which does not ex-
nThe definition was first enunciated in Davis v. St. Paul Indem. Co., 227 N.C.
80, 40 S.E. 2d 6o9, 611 (1946). It was subsequently adopted in: Seward v. Assur-
ance Co. of America, 218 Cal. App. 2d 895, 32 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Super. Ct. 1963);
Midlo v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 16o So. 2d 314, 315 (La. Ct. App. 1964);
Englehart v. Assurance Co. of America, 139 So. 2d 1o8, 113 (La. Ct. App. 1962);
Deckler v. Travelers Indem. Co., 94 So. 2d 55, 5
8 (La. Ct. App. 1957); Loop v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 63 So. 2d 247, 248 (La. Ct. App. 1953); Caldwell v.
St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 210 Miss. 320, 49 So. 2d 570, 572 (1950); Conlin v.
Dakota Fire Ins. Co., 126 N.W.-d 421, 425 (N.D. 1964); Gordon v. Eureka Cas. Co.,
187 Pa. Super. 636, 146 A.2d 379, 38o (1958); Sigel v. American Guarantee & Liab.
Ins. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 434, 98 A.2d 376, 381 (1953).
1ISupra note 7. The insurance company definition is essentially that of Kelly,
supra note 16, at 77, who said: "First: The disappearance must be from a clearly
identified location .... Second: The circumstances should suggest theft as the logical
explanation." Although this definition was drawn from an analysis of the "circum-
stantial evidence" and "presumption of theft" cases would be helpful in
deciding cases involving the older mysterious disappearance provisions, it seems in-
appropriately restrictive in view of the 1956 revision.
3'Hammontree v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 4, at 666-67. The notion
is not new that the reasonable understanding and intent of the insured should
govern in interpreting the construction of clauses in his policy. See, e.g., 1 Couch,
Insurance § 15:14 (2d ed. 1959); 13 Appleman, Insurance § 7402, at 96-97 (1943).
n1 6o So. 2d 314 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (insured had strung ring on handkerchief
in his pocket; both disappeared). The breadth of the court's statement invites an
"all-risk" interpretation which is not necessarily warranted by the factual situation.
'OId. at 316.
